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BACKGROUND OF THE SHANGHAI TROUBLE 
The International Settlement 
THE International Settlement of Shanghai is a plot of marshy ground 8 2/3 square miles in extent, or one~ 
third the size of Manhattan, which has grown into a for~ 
eign settlement out of British and American land conces~ 
sions obtained from the Chinese in the '40's. It is 
immune from Chinese control. 
Its ascent from a mudflat to a commercial metropolis 
fourth or fifth among world ports has been accompanied 
by the development of a near~independence. Quite early 
the foreign residents established a Municipal Council, 
which, in the course of time, has become an administra~ 
tive organ with very ramified powers. At present it is 
composed of six Britishers, five Chinese, one American 
and two Japanese. An American is director~general, a 
post equivalent to that of Mayor, or city manager, in the 
United States. 
The Council, strangely enough, has no courts to inter~ 
pret its own regulations or to punish infractions of them. 
The 2 7, 000 foreign residents are responsible, not to the 
Municipal Council, not to the Chinese, but to tlieir own 
consuls, who maintain a system of consular courts in 
Shanghai. This is not peculiar to Shanghai. Foreigners 
throughout China 'are withdrawn from Chinese jurisdic~ 
tion in virtue of the system known as extraterritoriality. 
In Shanghai this system qualifies a status for the Settle~ 
ment that would otherwise be that of a free city or a 
minature republic under the powers' protection. 
There are nearly a million Chinese within this tiny 
ghetto. In the last few years they have been responsib1e 
to their own courts. 
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In addition to a local volunteer force, under the 
Municipal Council, foreign governments, in protection 
of their nationals, if not of the Settlement itself, station 
troops in Shanghai. Soldiers and marines are coming 
and going all the time. 
China's "Revolutionary Diplomacy" 
The presence of foreign troops in Shanghai would not 
be necessary if there were no danger of trouble from the 
Chinese. Such danger, however, exists, and it keeps the 
troops ever on the alert. It arises from the stated policy 
of the Chinese Nationalist government to effect the resto~ 
ration of the Settlement to Chinese control. 
The policy is in the nature of a campaign sometimes 
called "revolutionary diplomacy," sometimes "rights~ 
recovery. To foreign correspondents in Peking in 
December, 1929, Foreign Minister C. T . Wang outlined 
its chronology as follows: 1930, abolition of extraterri~ 
toriality; I 9 3 I , recovery of foreign concessions and set~ 
tlements; 1933, recovery of leased territories, etc. 
There has never been any disguise of the manner in 
which these privileges were to be regained. Preferably 
the Chinese want them returned on the dates set by them~ 
selves by diplomatic negotiations. But "revolutionary 
diplomacy" does not stop at negotiations. It aims at the 
achievement of its object regardless of means. If diplo~ 
matic negotiations do not progress satisfactorily to the 
Chinese, unilateral denunciation of treaties is regarded as 
the second weapon of attack. This weapon has already 
been employed against a t least a dozen powers. Force, 
direct or indirect, is the final weapon, and this, too, has 
been used frequently-in the early days of the Nationalist 
movement, when it was directed by Soviet Russians, 
without trying any other method. 
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The use of force against foreign land concessions dates 
from January 3, I 9 2 7. Nationalist mobs invaded the 
British concession at Hankow, the premier port other 
than Shanghai on the Yangtze river, and turned out the 
British authority. The theft was subsequently ratified by 
an agreement with the British dated February 19. 
China's success at Hankow encouraged further forceful 
experiments. All eyes were turned on Shanghai. To the 
Settlement, in consequence of the fact that it is an oasis 
in a howling desert of Chinese misrule, has gravitated for 
safekeeping much of the surplus wealth of the Chinese 
people. Even the Treasury reserve of the Nanking gov-
ernment is now held there. Hoards of such fabulous 
dimensions, added to the wealth of a great city in its own 
right, have never ceased to beckon China's civil warriors. 
What a city to sack I The Nationalists, over the heads of 
their Soviet Russian advisers, who wished to push on to 
Peking, decided to sidetrack the Revolution from Hankow 
to Shanghai. On the heels of the successful assault on 
the Hankow concession, they came swarming down the 
Yangtze river. 
This time the British took alarm. Most of their 
$1,500,000,000 of investments in China, are located at 
Shanghai. So they dispatched an expeditionary force to 
defend the Settlement from the expected incursion. With 
the cooperation of other powers, including the United 
States and Japan, the zone was saved by the presence 
of an allied force numbering 25,000. It is ~he testimony 
of all observers that but for the Allied forces it would 
assuredly have shared the fate of Hankow. This experi-
ence, together with the "revolutionary diplomacy" of the 
Nationalist government, will account for the military 
activity which has never since been absent from Shanghai. 
In 1 9 2 7 the British took the lead in these defensive 
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measures. For they had been, and were at the time, the 
target of Nationalist odium. There was no let-up in the 
agitation even as a result of the British government's 
resignation of the Hankow concession. The British con-
tinued to be "arch-imperialists" and all Chinese who had 
anything to do with them their "running dogs." Con-
temporary accounts afford vivid proof of the manner in 
which, from Canton to Peking (Peiping), their rights 
were trampled upon and their persons assailed. 
Neutralization Proposals in Shanghai 
In Shanghai the stand that the British decided to make 
was dictated by the feeling that unless they did so · not 
only would the Settlement be overrun but they would be 
driven out of China by force. But in the Settlement they 
were on a pinpoint of land, a third the size of Manhattan. 
From a military standpoint the defense of the zone would 
have been no defense at all unless carried beyond its 
legal boundaries. So the British went outside in order to 
establish a neutral zone. Moreover, they disarmed 
Chinese troops in that extra-Settlement area. 
The neutralization of a greater Shanghai has, in fact, 
been bruited for many years. Strange as it may sound, 
it has even had Chinese adherence. When the Com-
munist-Nationalist mob came surging down the Yangtze 
river to take Shanghai, C. T. Wang, who later became 
Nationalist Foreign Minister, urged neutralization of an 
extensive zone surrounding Shanghai. He was then on 
the other side from the Nationalists. 
Mr. Wang's effort had two results. One was the pro-
posal of Secretary Kellogg, dated February 5, 1 9 2 7, for 
the neutralization of the Settlement. As the Settlement 
is neutralized as a matter of course, no power took up 
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the suggestion. The next result was the creation by force 
of a neutral zone by the defensive forces in 1 9 2 7. 
In Tientsin, the largest port in North China, there is 
a precedent for the neutralization of outer Shanghai. 
After the Boxer outrages in 1900, the Chinese were com· 
pelled to sign an undertaking to neutralize access to the 
sea, all the way from Peking (Peiping) to Tientsin and 
on to Shanhaikwan. 
The Japanese cooperated in the 1 9 2 7 defensive meas· 
ures at Shanghai. For they were as anxious as the British 
that the Settlement should be protected against Nation-
alist assault. In absolute terms their interests in Shanghai 
are perhaps second to Britain's. But they are far more 
important to Japan than the investments of other powers 
are to them. This is how Professor George H. Blakeslee, 
now attached to the State Department, regards them: 
"Japanese investments appear in a different class from 
those of other countries. They are not a foreign luxury, 
but seem to be essential for the maintenance of the pres-
ent economic status of Japan" (Foreign Affairs, October, 
1931 ). 
In point of policy toward nationals abroad, however, 
the protection of lives takes precedence over the pro-
tection of their property. In this respect the Japanese 
interest is unique. The total Japanese colony in the 
Settlement and its environs is 26,000. This happens to 
be only a few hundred short of the total foreign popula-
tion of the Settlement. Few non-Japanese foreigners 
live outside the Settlement limits in Chinese territory. 
But, as these figures show, a great percentage of the 
Japanese popula tion do; and this affords an edge to the 
Japanese desire for a neutral zone, and in the direction 
that the Japanese have taken up their residence. 
The whole of the Chinese territory outside of the 
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Settlement which we have called Shanghai's environs 
bears the generic name of Greater Shanghai. It is split 
up into various areas, all under Chinese jurisdiction. 
Feeding upon the Settlement, and the foreign trade and 
industry that it attracts, these areas have developed cheek 
by jowl with it, and hold another two million Chinese. 
One of them is Chapei, where the people are tightly 
packed in narrow streets, and where the Japanese number 
6,000. Chapei is situated next to the portion of the 
Settlement called Hongkew which has come to be 
referred to as "the Japanese section" because of the pre-
ponderance of Japanese among the foreign residents. 
In Greater Shanghai are congregated the most articulate 
among China's population. Either in Chinese territory 
or in the Settlement, communists, students, professional 
agitators and other disorderly elements maintain their 
headquarters.· 
The Boycott as a Weapon 
The Japanese have been through similar ordeals as 
the British went through in 192 7. Soon it was their turn 
to succeed them as the goat for the hoodlums. In May, 
1928 the Japanese sent some troops into the province of 
Shantung solely to protect their nationals during an 
upheaval. When the danger was over, they were with-
drawn, and would have been withdrawn earlier but for 
the appeal of Chiang Kai-shek, then President of the 
Nationalist government and still its de facto head, that 
they should delay evacuation until he had obtained com-
plete control of the province: In spite of Chiang's 
request, however, Japan became the victim of a boycott 
movement (the seventh she ha·d had to endure in China), 
which is a form of the third weapon, the weapon of force, 
of China's "revolutionary diplomacy." 
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There is a great deal of misunderstanding of the 
Chinese boycott in the United States. This is rather sur-
prising, as the United States was the first victim of it. 
An anti-American boycott occurred in 1905 by way of 
protest against American exclusion of Chinese immigra-
tion in the United States. United States Minister Rockhill, 
who landed in China while it was in full swing, defined 
it as "a conspiracy in restraint of our trade carried on 
under official guidance and with the sympathy of the cen-
tral government." (Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela-
tions of the U. S. , 1905, p. 218.) Acting on his defini-
tion, he insisted p eremptorily that the government should 
call it off. In a note transmitted at the request of Secre-
tary Elihu Root, he said: 
"My government is emphatically of the opm10n that it has 
been and still is the duty of the Imperial government com-
pletely to put a stop to this movement which is carried on in 
open violation of solemn treaty provisions and of the laws of 
China and is an unwarranted attempt of the ignorant people to 
assume the functions of government and to meddle with inter-
national relations." (p. 223.) 
At the same time he asked for the support of other 
powers in putting down the movement with rigorous 
severity in areas in which they had influence. An appeal 
was made to the ]apa~ese at the Manchurian port of 
Newchwang. People whispered that the Japanese, far 
from helping the Americans, were covertly encouraging 
the boycott. Minister Rockhill felt called upon to give 
the lie to these calumnies. He reported to Secretary 
Root: 
"I beg that the Department will not attach importance to 
the statements being made in the ports and in the United States 
press that the Japanese government has had anything to do 
with encouraging the present anti-American movement. The 
conduct of the Japanese government has been not only friendly 
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throughout, but their foreign office has done all in its power to 
arrest the movement and control the Japanese controlled papers 
published in China." (p. 213.) 
With this cooperation, and with the requisite Chinese 
official action, the movement eventually came to an end. 
What Japan Objects To 
This precedent, together with Minister Rockhill's defi-
nition, should be kept firmly in mind in approaching the 
Japanese reaction to the Chinese boycott. Japan does 
not object to the spontaneous refusal of individuals to 
buy Japanese goods. It is farcical to think that the 
Japanese could be so ridiculous. Japan, like every other 
trading nation, is zealous in soliciting Chinese patronage 
for her products. She can go no further than that. 
What Japan objects to is the following: 
( I ) The establishment of boycott association clothed 
indirectly or directly with extra-legal power. 
(2) Scurrillous anti-Japanese propaganda in the press, 
virulent anti-Japanese posters, compulsory non-
buying and non-selling, lynching of "traitor" 
merchants who do business with the Japanese, 
compulsory strikes in Japanese factories in China, 
assaults upon, and insults to, Japanese merchants, 
burning of Japanese goods and confiscation of 
Japanese goods. 
The acts under ( 2) are all inspired and organized by 
the boycott associations. They are the work of profes-
sional hoodlums, who are protected by or who pro-
tect {according to the point of view) the Nanking 
government. 
There is no need to stress the utter dislocation of 
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Chinese government. It was borne out in every news-
paper dispatch from China prior to the Manchurian affair 
of September 18 last year. If the facts were not regis-
tered in Western consciousness at the time, they were 
hammered into the consciousness of Japan, which, it is 
well to reiterate, is located next door to China and its 
chaos. The Nanking government's weakness is disguised 
from the world because it derives strength from its recog-
nition by the powers as the government of China. 
Therein also lies its only appeal to the malcontents. 
When foreign affairs become pressing, they climb on 
board the ship of state, as they did in October, when they 
overran the ministries and beat Foreign Minister C. T. 
Wang almost to death. Otherwise, disregarding the gov-
ernment, which is futile at home, they enforce as govern-
ment action the illegal acts of their own boycott associa-
tions. In Minister Rockhill's words, they "assume the 
functions of government." 
The Provocation of the Boycott 
Since 1 9 2 7 the Chinese government has officially 
adhered to the boycott as a means for achieving its diplo-
matic ends. This was not the case in 1905. As one 
of the organs of the Nationalist Party, it derives all its 
authority from that organization. And the party consti-
tution is the embodiment of the "Three People's prin-
ciples" advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, so-called father 
of the Nationalist Revolution. Dr. Sun urged his fol-
lowers to resort to anti-foreignism and economic boycott 
in order to accomplish his principles, in particular "the 
principle of Nationalism." Consequently the boycott and 
anti-foreign movement generally have been recognized 
officially by the party and through the party by the 
government. 
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It is not necessary to produce japanese evidence of 
the provocation endured by the japanese in the 1928 
boycott. The London Times of june 1, 1929 provides it. 
The boycott was still raging. In the course of a two-
column a r ticle on conditions in China, this British news-
paper, which has a universal reputation for accuracy, first 
explains that the powers of the Tang Pu (branch councils 
of the Nationalist party) are absolute in China. Then it 
says that in Shanghai the Anti-japanese Boycott Society 
"had the local branch of the Kuomintang (Nationalist 
party) in their pocket." In other words, if the Tang Pu 
had extra-legal powers, the Boycott Society must have 
had super extra-legal powers. These they were demon-
strating at the time the article was written. 
"They seized whatever rooms they wanted in the Chamber of 
Commerce for t heir offices ; radical meetings of all sorts were 
held in its assembly Hall; and when the Chamber tried to pro-
test, it was told to take its choice-to put up with things or be 
put out of its premises." 
Suppose a group of students from Columbia University 
decided to boycott goods made in Spain. Suppose they 
occupied the premises of the New York Chamber of 
Commerce. That is the equivalent situation to that 
which existed in Shanghai in 1929. It is because of its 
ridiculousness that people in the West find it so hard to 
appreciate what the boycott really means in China. 
But let us go back to the impartial report of the London 
Times: 
"The gates of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce 
are tightly barricaded. All the work of the Chamber is sus-
pended, and its rooms resound to the tread of armed guards. 
So they will remain until -such time as Nanking can make up 
its mind whether it will suppor t the real pillars of Chinese busi-
. ness or the agitator and the political rowdy. It is a grave situa-
tion. On the one side is organized business, capital, the best 
brains in the country, the men who are most honest in their 
desire to bring reform and progress to China; on the other are 
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the wastrels and freebooters of the Anti-Japanese Boycott 
Society (now politely called the National Salvation Society) 
and a host of mushroom organizations grouped together in the 
so-called Union of Merchants and Citizens of Greater Shanghai, 
professing to represent the Chinese middle and lower class mer-
chant, but in truth representing nobody but themselves. The 
union, which hates the chamber for its prestige and wealth, and 
the boycotters, who hate the chamber because it has dared to 
assert that with settlement of the Tsinan (Shantung) affair the 
Japanese boycott ought to cease, have made the chamber's life 
a misery. And they have been steadily backed up by the 
Shanghai Tang-Pu, which has always been among the "reddest" 
of the district councils." 
Japan's Diplomacy 
Grievous as was their provocation, the japanese in 
1928 and 1929 did nothing. In pursuance of an attitude 
of patient conciliation dating from the end of the Wash-
ington Conference in 1922, they waited until the affair 
had blown over. It came to an end, as these things do, 
when a diversion occurred. China got embroiled with 
Soviet Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Man-
churia, and, like a flock of locusts, the "wastrels and 
freebooters'' moved to other pastures, where they vented 
their professional patriotism. The Japanese resumed 
business. 
But abroad the Japanese tried to do something. They 
tried to persuade the world, which, in the meantime, had 
come to accept the Kellogg-Briand Pact banning war as 
an instrument of national policy, that war might be 
invisible as well as visible. They had in mind this kind 
of organized boycott, this "conspiracy," as Minister 
Rockhill called it. At the Kyoto Conference of the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations they put forth the thesis that the 
boycott was being used 
(a) as an instrument of national policy. 
(b) as a warlike act. 
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Therefore, contended the Japanese, it should be out-
lawed along with the kind of war that the world knew as 
war. Mr. Masunosuke Odagiri, director of the Y oko-
hama Specie Bank, in a paper at the Kyoto conference 
said: 
"It would seem that the continued application of the boycott 
as an instrument to settle international disputes is not only 
highly provocative and unjust in the light of accepted principles 
of international intercourse between friendly peoples, but, if war 
is to be condemned as an instrument of national policy, so also 
must the boycott be outlawed." 
Perhaps the most important result of the overture was 
the contribution of Professor James T. Shotwell, of 
Columbia University, one of the unofficial fathers of the 
Kellogg Pact. In the course of his remarks, he said: "I 
can say quite frankly here that the Pact of Paris fails 
signally to answer the question of what is war and what is 
peaceful settlement." Possibly this pregnant sentence 
was not in response to Mr. Odagiri. It may have been 
inspired by the visit to China that Mr. Shotwell undertook 
before he arrived in Japan. At any rate, he asked a 
question for which Minister Rockhill had already pro-
vided and the Japanese were trying to provide the 
answer. 
Beyond this statement little came of the Japanese 
friendly, diplomatic and peaceful effort. Things went 
from bad to worse in China. Viewed again relatively, 
they appeared much worse to Japan, a next-door neigh-
bor to them, than to the nations of the West. Then the 
world depression arrived, and hit Japan, which had just 
climbed painfully and laboriously back to the gold 
standard after the terrible setback of the Japanese earth-
quake of 1923, perhaps worse than other nations. A 
boycott this time could not be regarded with the same 
equanimity as it had been in the past down to 1929. 
(14) 
Chinese Government and the Boycott 
But such a movement did develop in China - the 
eighth. And it developed with a ferocity without parallel 
in the turbulent history of Chinese boycotts. Little was 
heard about it in the West, because a boycott, being 
scattered, underground and non-spectacular, is not very 
interesting news, unless it develops into mass collisions. 
Lack of information explains why the majority of people 
imagine that the present boycott came as the result of 
the Manchurian affair of September 18, when Chinese 
and Japanese troops clashed. This is wrong. It came 
months before as the result of a petty row over a ground 
lease which took place between Chinese and Koreans at 
a north Manchurian village in the summer of 19 31 . The 
trouble spread into anti-Chinese demonstrations in Korea, 
which the Japanese eventually put down with a firm 
hand, and an anti-Japanese boycott in China, which the 
Chinese government supported. 
The evidence of official support on this occasion is 
very clear. As usual, Shanghai was the radiating center. 
It directed the Nanking government. Instruction No. 444, 
issued by the Government Department of Railways, 
dated August 7, six weeks prior to the Manchurian affair 
of September 18, says quite frankly that the Department 
had received the following telegram under date of 
July 31 from the joint committee of the various anti-
Japanese associations at Shangllai: 
"Taking advantage of the Wanpaoshan incident, the Japane!e 
have started a violent anti-Chinese movement by instigating 
Koreans by whom our nationals in Korea were massacred in 
large numbers and have been otherwise placed under unspeak-
able atrocities. At this critical moment in this nation, the 
entire people should unite in their common protest against 
Japan and carry out an economic disruption against her at all 
cost. Such an economic disruption, however, is only a tem-
porary measure and is sufficient neither for the promotion of 
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Chinese industries nor to check the importation of Japanese 
goods. Special transportation facility should be extended to 
domestic coal and other raw materials inasmuch as upon them 
depends the development of the nation's industrial life1 so as to 
enable the reduction of their cost. Complete check of tne impor-
tation of Japanese coal and other raw materials into China 
may not be possible in a day, but efforts may profitably be 
made for the reduction of the amount of their importation; such 
a policy will certainly prove a permanent measure. We hereby 
request, acting under the resolution passed by the fifth executive 
committee of the anti-Japanese association, that your Depart-
ment will be good enough to adopt this petition." 
Then the Department goes on to say: 
"The foregoing petition has as its object the restriction of 
the importation of Japanese coal for which your co-operation is 
asked. You are ordered to extend every facility to the transpor-
tation of domestic coal. You should see to it that the sufficient 
number of freight carriages is provided for the speedy trans-
portation of this important raw material." 
Imagine the Interstate Commerce Commission circu-
lating such an order as this at the behest of the Columbia 
students. It is a topsy-turvy world that we have to deal 
with. 
Spa1:e forbids the enumeration of more illustrations. 
They are numerous. And they can be found in a collec-
tion compiled by the League of Nations Association of 
Japan, 12, Nichome, Marunouchi, Tokyo. It is apparent 
from a reading of this collection that orders began to 
pour out of the Nationalist government offices invoking 
the boycott in deference to orders from the Shanghai 
associations. 
Came the Manchurian affair of September 18. Since 
this sketch is dealing specifically with the background of 
the trouble at Shanghai, we will not outline the Japanese 
case here, but as a sidelight on the provocations that the 
Japanese have endured for years past, provocations 
which led directly to the Shanghai as well as the Man-
churian situation, we might pause to give the testimony 
(16) 
of non-Japanese on the spot. This should insure impar-
tiality and neutrality. It should also insure what is so 
important to the Japanese at this juncture, namely, knowl-
edgeability. The testimony comes from the Tientsin 
British Committee of Information, a body composed of 
British business men, and it takes the form of a letter to 
the Peking and Tientsin Times, a British-owned newspaper, 
dated October 24. The letter is signed for the Com-
mittee by its chairman, Mr. P . H. B. Kent. Inter alia, 
the Committee says: 
"The fact is that the Chinese, by a policy of utter irresponsi-
bility and all-round aggravation, brought this upon themselves. 
They literally goaded the Japanese into action. Braggadocio 
and arrogance on the one hand were united with prolonged 
dodging of responsibility on the other." 
Japan's Decision to Act 
We come now to the place from which, in times of 
foreign crisis, the Nanking government takes its orders, 
namely, Shanghai. Aware that they could get nowhere 
in their presentation of the boycott as a violation of the 
Kellogg Pact, harassed by their economic difficulties, the 
Japanese decided to take unilateral action. Boycott 
troubles were increasing in intensity. It is difficult to 
conceive of these incidents occurring in another country 
as important to any other major power as China is to 
Japan without that power acting similarly. In fact, as 
we have seen, Japan had plenty of precedent even in 
China itself. 
Incident piled on incident to warrant the Japanese 
decision. On January 9 a Shanghai Chinese paper called 
the Republican Daily News published an article insulting 
the honor of the Japanese Imperial House. The throne 
occupies a position in Japan that is probably unique 
(17) 
among modern peoples. Imagine, therefore, the feeling 
that these aspersions created in Japanese breasts. Nine 
days later, on January 18, a party of Japanese priests, on 
their way to service, were attacked. One was killed and 
three were severely wounded. 
There is an exact parallel for this latter outrage. On 
June 21, 1870, a mixed mob of rowdies and soldiers 
brutaUy murdered the priests and sisters of the Roman 
Catholic Cathedral in Tientsin, which was under French 
protection. The Chinese were made to pay dearly for 
their misbehavior. A large indemnity was exacted, the 
prefect and magistrate were banished, and the then super-
itendent of Trade was sent to France with a letter of 
apology from the Emperor. 
Local passions in Shanghai began to run higher after 
the attack on the Japanese priests. The Japanese pro-
ceeded to act with the preemptoriness of Minister Rock-
hill. On January 21 the Consul General presented to 
the Mayor of Greater Shanghai four demands the central 
feature of which called for the dissolution of those per-
nicious extra-1egal anti-Japanese societies run, according 
to the London Times, by "wastrels and freebooters." 
Nothing was done for a week. But there was nothing 
static about the ferment. Feeling mounted to such a 
tension point that the Municipal Council, declaring that 
a state of emergency existed, assigned the defense of the 
Settlement to the foreign forces to take effect as from 
4 p.m. on January 28. One hour before, 3 p.m., the 
Chinese Mayor complied with the Japanese demands. 
But, instead of quieting down, things grew far more 
threatening, and the forces proceeded according to 
schedule to their assigned sectors at the boundaries of the 
Settlement. It was while the Japanese marines were 
going to their posts in Hongkew, facing the Chinese dis-
(18) 
trict of Chapei, that the shots were fired that precipitated 
the conflict. 
There has been no statement from the Municipal Coun-
cil as to the nature of the emergency which caused them 
to proclaim a state of siege. The only contribution from 
neutral s~urces appears in a report submitted by the con-
sular committee hurriedly appointed by the League of 
Nations. According to the newspaper summary, this 
simply states that it is impossible to establish the origin 
of the firing. 
Self-Defense, Not War 
The japanese are convinced that their account is 
accurate. This is that (a) malcontents had made their 
way into the Settlement and were demonstrating their 
anti-japonism, (b) that immediately on the acceptance 
of the Japanese demands the Chinese police vanished 
from the streets of Chapei, (c) that the hoodlums were 
sharing control with the semi-mutinous Nineteenth Route 
Army. 
The japanese version has never been denied. And 
there is circumstantial ~vidence that it is correct. We 
have seen in what manner the hoodlums controlled 
the Nanking government. If they controlled the govern-
ment, they surely controlled a local Mayor. It stands to 
reason that hoodlumism of this order would not brook 
of any peace-making. 
Back of the hoodlums were the Nineteenth Route 
Army, a Cantonese force which, when the Cantonese 
faction, defeated in its project of declaring war on Japan, 
was ejected from the Nanking government in January, 
came streaming down to Shanghai. They were ripe for 
any mischief. 
Already the melee had started in the afternoon of 
(19) 
January 28. Should the Japanese have stayed on their 
sector and suffered their fellow-countrymen across the 
way to be slaughtered~ This is asking a good deal of 
flesh and blood. There were 6,000 Japanese in Chapei, 
at the mercy of these anti-Japanese elements. Only an 
imaginary line divided the mar~nes from going to their 
rescue. The marines, like the ~ritish in 192 7, went over 
that line. 
That there can have been no preconceived plan of 
military operations is apparent from these facts: 
{a) The Shanghai area is a quagmire. The "carts" of 
the local farmers are boats. 
{b) The Japanese, with their vast interests, have a 
stake in the preservation of peace in the Settle-
ment and its vinicity. 
{c) The Japanese were immensely outnumbered. 
(d) The Japanese marines had to contend, back and 
front, with the pest of military men, the plain-
clothes fighter, who had got into the International 
Settlement in large numbers, and who infested 
the narrow streets of Chapei. There is a simple 
rule in every army for dealing with him, treat-
ment which, incidentally, may explain the atrocity 
stories. 
Hence the Japanese contend that their action in 
Shanghai is self-defensive. 
(20) 
